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THE POWER OF THE LARGEST PLAYER
SASCHA KURZ
Abstract. Decisions in a shareholder meeting or a legislative committee are
often modeled as a weighted game. Influence of a member is then measured
by a power index. A large variety of different indices has been introduced in
the literature. This paper analyzes how power indices differ with respect to
the largest possible power of a non-dictatorial player. It turns out that the
considered set of power indices can be partitioned into two classes. This may
serve as another indication which index to use in a given application.
JEL classification: C61, C71
Keywords: power measurement; weighted games
1. Introduction
Consider a community association with four property owners having shares of 50%,
26%, 15%, and 9%, respectively. Assume that decisions are of a simple “yes” or “no”
nature and that the owners decide with a two-thirds majority rule. Such a decision
environment can be modeled as a weighted game, where the players have non-
negative weights w1, . . . , wn. Any subset S of the players, called coalition, can adopt
a proposal if and only if the sum of their weights
∑
i∈S wi meets or exceeds a given
positive quota q. The collection [q;w1, . . . , wn] is then called a weighted game, e.g.,
[0.67; 0.50, 0.26, 0.15, 0.09] in our example. Note that those voting weights are often
a poor proxy for players’ influence. Whenever S is a coalition including the third
but excluding the fourth player and T is the coalition obtained from exchanging
player three by player four, then coalition S can bring through a proposal if and
only if coalition T can do. So, the third and the fourth player are symmetric in
terms of their influence on the decision, which is not reflected by the weights.
The literature has thus introduced several more sophisticated ways of measuring
a players’ influence in weighted games. Unfortunately, different indices can lead to
very different predictions. For our example we obtain relative power distributions
of (0.50, 0.30, 0.10, 0.10), 112 · (7, 3, 1, 1), (1, 0, 0, 0), or (0.40, 0.20, 0.20, 0.20) for the
Penrose-Banzhaf index, the Shapley-Shubik index, the nucleolus, and the Public
Good index, respectively.
One way to decide which power index to choose for a given application is to
employ one of the known axiomatizations, see e.g. [3] and [4], and to check which
axioms are satisfied. Here, we consider the power of the largest player, without
full power. It will turn out that the possible values differ significantly for different
power indices, which may also allow to exclude the suitability of certain power
indices in a given application. Although this theoretical question is quite natural,
it has not been treated in the literature so far.
Another application of our results stems from the so-called inverse power index
problem, see e.g. [2, 5, 6, 8]. It asks for a simple or weighted game v such that
the corresponding power distribution (according to a given power index p) meets a
given ideal power distribution σ as closely as possible. Since there is only a finite
number of different weighted or simple games, it is obvious that some power vectors
can not be approximated too closely if the number of voters is small. [1] show that
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2 SASCHA KURZ
there are also vectors that are hard to approximate by the Penrose-Banzhaf index of
a simple game if most of the mass of the vector is concentrated on a small number
of coordinates. Generalizations and impossibility results for other power indices
have been obtained in [7]. So, if we know that pi(v) = 1 or pi(v) ≤ λ, for any
simple game v, and σi lies somewhere in the middle of the interval [λ, 1], then p(v)
has a significant distance to σ provided that λ is not close to 1.
2. Preliminaries
By N = {1, . . . , n} we denote the set of players. A simple game is a surjective
and monotone mapping v : 2N → {0, 1} from the set of subsets of N into a binary
output {0, 1}. Monotone means v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ T ⊆ N . The values
of this mapping can be interpreted as follows. For each subset S of N , called
coalition, we have v(S) = 1 if the members of S can adopt a proposal even though
the members of N\S are against it. If v(S) = 1 we speak of a winning coalition
and a losing coalition otherwise. A winning coalition S is called minimal if all
of its proper subsets are losing. Similarly, a losing coalition T is maximal if all
of its proper supersets are winning. A simple game v is weighted if there exist
weights w1, . . . , wn ∈ R≥0 and a quota q ∈ R>0 such that v(S) = 1 exactly if
w(S) :=
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q. Two players i and j are called symmetric, in a given simple
game v, if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for all ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N\{i, j}. Player i ∈ N is a null
player if v(S) = v(S ∪ {i}) for all ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N\{i}, i.e., player i is not contained in
any minimal winning coalition. A player that is contained in every minimal winning
coalition is called a veto player. If {i} is a winning coalition (note that ∅ is a losing
coalition), then player i is a passer. If additionally all other players are null players,
then we call player i a dictator.
A power index p is a mapping from the set of simple (or weighted) games on n
players into Rn. By pi(v) we denote the ith component of p(v), i.e., the power of
player i. As an example consider the Shapley-Shubik index :
SSIi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|! · (n− |S| − 1)!
n!
· (v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)) .
The list of power indices that have been proposed in the literature so far is long.
In order to keep the paper compact and self-contained, we follow the proposed
taxonomy of [7] and refer the reader, e.g., to that paper for more references and
details. We call p positive if p(v) ∈ Rn≥0\{0} and efficient if
∑n
i=1 pi(v) = 1
for all games v. For any positive power index p we obtain an efficient version
by pi(v)/
∑n
j=1 pj(v). Applying this to
∑
S⊆N\{i} (v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)) gives the
Penrose-Banzhaf index BZI. We call a coalition S ∪ {i} critical for i, if v(S ∪
{i})− v(S) = 1. Then player i called critical. Note that not all players of a critical
coalition are critical.
Instead of counting critical coalitions, we can also count the minimal winning
coalitions containing a given player i. Normalizing to an efficient version, as above,
gives the Public Good index PGI. The so-called equal division counting function
gives each relevant player of a counted coalition the same share, so that they sum
up to one. More concretely ∑
{i}⊆S⊆N :S is minimal winning
1
|S|
gives the non-normalized version of the Deegan-Packel index DP for player i, i.e.,
it arises from the PGI by equal division. Equal sharing among the critical players
of a coalition turns the Penrose-Banzhaf index into the Johnston index Js. The
definition of the nucleolus Nuc is a bit more involved. For a simple game v and a
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vector x ∈ Rn we call e(S, x) = v(S) − x(S) the excess of S at x, where x(S) :=∑
i∈S xi. It can be interpreted as quantifying the coalition’s dissatisfaction and
potential opposition to an agreement on allocation x. For any fixed x let S1, . . . , S2n
be an ordering of all coalitions such that the excesses at x are weakly decreasing,
and denote these ordered excesses by E(x) =
(
e(Sk, x)
)
k=1,...,2n
. Vector x is
lexicographically less than vector y if Ek(x) < Ek(y) for the smallest component
k with Ek(x) 6= Ek(y). The nucleolus x? of v is then uniquely defined as the
lexicographically minimal vector x with x(N) ≤ v(N) = 1, cf. [9]. For simple
games we automatically have x? ∈ Rn≥0 and x?(N) = 1. Several authors restrict
the definition to imputations, where x?i ≥ v({i}).
We call a power index p symmetric if pi(v) = pj(v) for symmetric players i, j in
v. If pi(v) = 0 for every null player i of v, then we say that p satisfies the null player
property. The six power indices introduced so far are positive, efficient, symmetric,
satisfy the null player property and are defined for all simple games.
There are a few other power indices that are just defined for a weighted game v
and based on representations. For our initial example we have
[0.67; 0.50, 0.26, 0.15, 0.09] = [5; 3, 2, 1, 1],
i.e., there can be several representations of the same weighted game. We can ob-
tain power indices for weighted games by averaging over all representations of a
certain type. If we restrict to integer weights and quota with minimum possible
weight sum
∑n
i=1 wi, we obtain the minimum sum representation index MSRI.
We may also average over all normalized weight vectors, i.e., over the polyhe-
dron Pw(v) =
{
w ∈ Rn≥0 :
∑n
i=1 wi = 1, w(S) ≥ w(T )∀ minimal winning S and
all maximal losing T
}
. With this the average weight index is given by
AWI(v) =
1∫
Pw(v)
dw
·
(∫
Pw(v)
w1 dw, . . . ,
∫
Pw(v)
wn dw
)
.
Taking also the quota into account we can consider P r(v) ={
(q, w) ∈ Rn+1≥0 :
n∑
i=1
wi = 1, q ≤ 1, w(S) ≥ q,∀ min.win. S,w(T ) ≤ q ∀ max.los. T
}
and define the average representation index as
ARI(v) =
1∫
P r(v)
d(q, w)
·
(∫
P r(v)
w1 d(q, w), . . . ,
∫
P r(v)
wn d(q, w)
)
.
All those three representation based power indices are positive, efficient and sym-
metric. The null voter property is only satisfied for the MSRI.
3. Results
For every positive, efficient power index that satisfies the null player property the
power of a dictator is exactly one. In this case, we speak of full power. So, the
largest possible power for a player is 1 and it is quite natural to ask for the largest
possible power of a player that is strictly less than 1. Since the number of simple
games is finite for each number n ∈ N of players, the answer is a well-defined
number, which possibly depends on n. If v is a simple game with n ≥ 2 players and
player i is not a dictator, then there exists a player j 6= i that is contained in some
minimal winning coalition S. Thus, for the Shapley-Shubik, the Penrose-Banzhaf,
the Public Good index, the Johnston index, and the Deegan-Packel index every
player with power 1 is a dictator. So, the condition that player i is not a dictator is
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equivalent to pi(v) < 1 in the following four theorems. Moreover, n ≥ 2 is implied
for the number of players. As preparation we observe:
Lemma 1. If v is a simple game with player set N , v(N\{i}) = 0, and v({i}) = 1,
then player i is a dictator.
Proof. Since v({i}) = 1 coalition N is not minimal winning. Due to v(N\{i}) = 0
player i is the only player that is contained in a minimal winning coalition, i.e., all
other players are null players. So, {i} is the unique minimal winning coalition and
player i is a dictator. 
Theorem 1. For each simple game v on n ≥ 2 players and each player i that is
not a dictator, we have SSIi(v) ≤ n−1n .
Proof. We compute
SSIi(v) =
1
n!
·
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|! · (n− |S| − 1)! · (v(S ∪ {i})− v(S))
≤ 1
n!
·
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|! · (n− |S| − 1)! = SSI1([1; 1, 0, . . . , 0]) = 1.
Since either v(N\{i}) = 1 or v({i}) = 0, due to Lemma 1, we have SSIi(v) ≤
1− (n−1)!·1!n! = n−1n . 
We remark that the upper bound is met for v = [n− 1;n− 1, 1, . . . , 1] and that
it approaches 1 as n tends to infinity.
Lemma 2. For n ≥ 2 and v = [n − 1;n − 1, 1, . . . , 1] we have SSI(v) = 1n(n−1) ·(
(n− 1)2, 1, . . . , 1), BZI(v) = 12n−1+n−2 · (2n−1 − 1, 1, . . . , 1), and Js(v) = 12n−1 ·(
2n−1 − 1, 1n−1 , . . . , 1n−1
)
.
Proof. For all 2n−1 − 1 coalitions ∅ ⊆ S ( N\{i} we have v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) = 1,
while v(N)−v(N\{i}) = 0. For any player j ∈ N\{i} the only coalition S ⊆ N\{j}
with v(S ∪ {j})− v(S) = 1 is given by S = N\{i, j}. 
Theorem 2. For each simple game v on n ≥ 2 players and each player i that is
not a dictator, we have BZIi(v) ≤ 2n−1−12n−1+n−2 .
Proof. Let ψj(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{j} (v(S ∪ {j})− v(S)), i.e., the Penrose-Banzhaf index
before normalization. Due to Lemma 1 we have v(N\{i}) = 1 or v({i}) = 0, so that
ψi(v) ≤ 2n−1 − 1. Assuming that v contains no null player, we have ψj(v) ≥ 1 for
all j ∈ N\{i} since j is contained in at least one minimal winning coalition. Thus,
BZIi(v) ≤ 2n−1−12n−1+n−2 . If v contains at least one null player h. Let v′ be the simple
game with player set N\{h} defined by v′(S) = v(S) for all ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N\{h}. For
any player j ∈ N\{h} and any coalition S ⊆ N\{j, h} we have v(S∪{j})−v(S) = 1
if and only if v(S ∪ {j, h})− v(S ∪ {h}) = 1, so that ψj(v) = 2ψj(v′). By induction
we get BZIi(v) ≤ 2n−2−12n−2+n−3 = 1 − n−22n−2+n−3 < 1 − n−12n−1+n−2 = 2
n−1−1
2n−1+n−2 for all
n ≥ 3. (Note that any simple game with n ≤ 2 players either contains a dictator
or no null player at all.) 
Similarly, we obtain:
Theorem 3. For each simple game v on n ≥ 2 players and each player i that is
not a dictator, we have Jsi(v) ≤ 2n−1−12n−1 .
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Proof. Let ψ′j(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{j}
(v(S ∪ {j})− v(S)) / (# of critical players of S), i.e.,
the Johnston index before normalization. Due to Lemma 1 we have v(N\{i}) = 1
or v({i}) = 0, so that ψ′i(v) ≤ 2n−1 − 1. Since there exists a minimal win-
ning coalition S ⊆ N\{i}, we have ∑j∈N\{i} ψ′j(v) ≥ ∑j∈S ψ′j(v) ≥ 1, so that
Jsi(v) ≤ 2n−1−12n−1 . 
Again, the upper bound of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 is met for v = [n− 1;n−
1, 1, . . . , 1], see Lemma 2, and approaches 1 as n tends to infinity.
Theorem 4. For each simple game v on n ≥ 2 players and each player i that is
not a dictator, we have PGIi(v) ≤ 12 and DPi(v) ≤ 12 .
Proof. If {i} is a winning coalition, then it is the only minimal winning coalition
containing player i. Due to Lemma 1, we have v(N\{i}) = 1, so that there exists
a minimal winning coalition S ⊆ N\{i}. Thus, PGIi(v) ≤ 12 . If {i} is a losing
coalition, then either i is a null player or any minimal winning coalition containing
player i has a cardinality of at least 2, so that PGIi(v) ≤ 12 . The same reasoning
applies to the Deegan-Packel index. 
The upper bound is attained for [1; 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0] and [2; 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0].
We remark that for complete simple games, a class in between weighted and
simple games, a power index (called Shift index ) based on counting so-called shift-
minimal winning coalitions instead of minimal winning coalitions and the corre-
sponding equal division version (called Shift Deegan-Packel index index ) can be
defined, see e.g. [7] and the references therein. The result of Theorem 4 and its
proof directly transfer.
The nucleolus is special. Of course the nucleolus also attributes power 1 to a
dictator. However, there are also non-dictatorial simple games where one player
gets a nucleolus power of 1. It is well known that the nucleolus of a simple game
with k ≥ 1 veto players assigns 1k to the veto players and zero to the remaining
players. For k = 1 we obtain all simple games with a player having full nucleolus
power.
Proposition 1. If v is a simple game and i be a player with Nuci(v) = 1, then i
is the unique veto player.
Proof. If player i is the unique veto player, then Nuci(v) = 1. If another player
is the unique veto player, then Nuci(v) = 0. If there are at least 2 veto players,
then Nuci(v) ≤ 12 . Thus, we can assume that v contains no veto players, so that
there exists a winning coalition S ⊆ N\{i}, and Nuci(v) = 1. Abbreviating Nuc(v)
by x?, we have x?(S) = 0, so that maxC⊆N e(C, x?) ≥ e(S, x?) = 1. However,
maxC⊆N e
(
C, 1n · (1, . . . , 1)
) ≤ n−1n < 1, which is a contradiction. 
Theorem 5. Let v be a simple game and i be a player with Nuci(v) < 1, then
Nuci(v) ≤ 12 .
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 1 we can assume that v contains no veto player,
choose a winning coalition S ⊆ N\{i}, and introduce the abbreviation x? = Nuc(v).
Note that we have n ≥ 2 players. Assume x?i > 12 and set ε := x?i − 12 > 0. Let T
be a winning coalition with minimal x?(T ). Since x?(S) ≤ 1− x?i = 12 − ε, we have
x?(T ) ≤ 12−ε. Now we define xi = 12 and xj = x?j+ εn−1 for all j ∈ N\{i}. For each
winning coalition W with i ∈W we have x(W ) ≥ 12 > x?(T ) and for each winning
coalition W ′ with i /∈ W ′ we have x(W ′) = x?(W ′) + |W ′| · εn−1 ≥ x?(T ) + εn−1 >
x?(T ), which is a contradiction to the minimality of the nucleolus. 
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The upper bound is, e.g., attained for simple games with exactly two veto players.
However, there are many other examples.
Theorem 6. For each weighted game v on n ≥ 2 players and each player i that is
not a dictator, we have MSRIi(v) ≤ 12 .
Proof. Suppose (q;w) ∈ Nn+1 is a representation of v with minimum ∑ni=1 wi and
set r :=
∑
j∈N\{i} wj ≥ 1. Assume wi ≥ r + 1. If q ≤ r, then we can replace wi
by r and obtain a representation with a smaller sum, a contradiction. If q ≥ r+ 1,
then player i is a veto player. Note that q ≥ wi + 1 ≥ r + 2, since otherwise
player i is a dictator. However, reducing q and wi by 1 gives a representation with
a smaller sum, again a contradiction. Thus, we have wi ≤ r for every minimum
sum representation, so that MSRIi(v) ≤ 12 . 
If player 1 is a dictator in a weighted game v, then the unique minimum sum
representation is given by [1; 1, 0, . . . ], so that MSRI1(v) = 1. The upper bound is
met by [k; k, 1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0], with k ≥ 2 players of weight 1.
For the average weight and the average representation index even a dictator does
not get a power of 1 for n ≥ 2 players.
Theorem 7. For each weighted game v on n ≥ 1 players and each player i, we
have AWIi(v) ≤ n+12n and ARIi(v) ≤ n+32(n+1) .
Proof. The statement is true for n = 1, so that we assume n ≥ 2. The maximum
values are clearly attained for a dictator. So, for v = [1; 1, 0, . . . , 0] we have∫
Pw(v)
dw =
∫ 1
1
2
∫ 1−w1
0
· · ·
∫ 1−w1−···−wn−2
0
dwn−1 . . . dw2 dw1.
Since
∫ y
0
(y−x)k
k! dx =
∫ y
0
xk
k! dx =
yk+1
(k+1)! for all k ∈ N, we recursively compute∫
Pw(v)
dw =
∫ 1
1
2
(1− w1)n−2
(n− 2)! dw1 =
∫ 1
2
0
wn−21
(n− 2)! dw1 =
1
2n−1 · (n− 1)!
and∫
Pw(v)
w1 dw =
∫ 1
1
2
w1(1− w1)n−2
(n− 2)! dw1 =
∫ 1
2
0
(1− w1)wn−21
(n− 2)! dw1 =
n+ 1
2n · n! ,
so that AWI1(v) = n+12n . Similarly, we have∫
P r(v)
dw =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
max{q,1−q}
∫ 1−w1
0
· · ·
∫ 1−w1−···−wn−2
0
dwn−1 . . . dw2 dw1 d q,
so that ∫
P r(v)
dw = 2
∫ 1
1
2
∫ 1
q
(1− w1)n−2
(n− 2)! dw1 d q =
1
2n−1 · n!
and ∫
P r(v)
w1 dw = 2
∫ 1
1
2
∫ 1
q
w1(1− w1)n−2
(n− 2)! dw1 d q =
n+ 3
2n · (n+ 1)! .
Thus, ARI1(v) = n+32(n+1) . 
We remark that the upper bound approaches 12 when n tends to infinity.
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4. Conclusion
For several power indices p we have determined tight upper bounds αp(n) for pi(v),
where pi(v) < 1 and v is either a simple or a weighted game on n players. The
considered power indices fall into two classes: If n tends to infinity, then αp(n)
approaches either 12 or 1.
More precisely, this implies:
Theorem 8. Let p be one of the power indices PGI, DP, Nuc, MSRI, AWI, or
ARI. For each ε > 0 there exists an integer N(ε) such that either pi(v) = 1 or
pi(v) ≤ 12 + ε for each simple game v on n ≥ N(ε) players and an arbitrary player
1 ≤ i ≤ n.
For the first four mentioned power indices we may even choose ε = 0 and N(ε) =
1. Such a “hole” in the space of possible power values does not occur for the power
indices SSI, BZI, or Js. If it is essential in an application to differentiate the
influence of a “large” player in different simple games, then the power indices from
Theorem 8 disqualify.
A direct implication for the inverse power index problem is given by:
Proposition 2. Let p be a power index and σ ∈ [0, 1]n with ∑ni=1 σi = 1 and
αp(n) ≤ σj ≤ 1 for some player 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Then, ‖σ − p(v)‖1 ≥ min{1− σj , σj −
αp(n)} for ever simple game v on n players.
For example, the desired power distribution σ = (0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . , 0) cannot be
approximated with ‖ · ‖1-distance strictly less than 14 by the power distribution of
a simple game according to one of the first four power indices from Theorem 8. For
similar results for the Penrose-Banzhaf index see [1] and [7].
Of course we may ask for upper bounds for pi(v), where pi(v) < αp(n), and so
on. For the Shapley-Shubik index and n ≥ 3 we conjecture that the next two upper
bounds are given by n−2n−1 =
n−1
n − 1n(n−1) and n
2−2n−1
n(n−1) =
n−1
n − 2n(n−1) . However,
it seems that those values approach the same limit as αp(n) in any case. In other
words, for the power of the largest player the only gap, except for small values, that
does not vanish when n increases, is given by (αp(n), 1). Similar questions can be
asked for the smallest player that is not a null-player or the second largest player
and so on.
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